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  Nearly 120 years ago, Frederick Douglass, the former slave and great African American leader, 
described the American criminal justice system as follows: “Justice is often painted with bandaged eyes.  
She is described in forensic eloquence, as utterly blind to wealth or poverty, high or low, white or black, 
but a mask of iron, however thick, could never blind American justice, when a black man happens to be 
on trial.” [FN1]  Sadly, little has changed in the century and a half since Douglass had cause to condemn 
the state of the justice system in America.  Nowhere is this more true than in the application of the 
“ultimate punishment”--the punishment of death. 
 
  After September 11th, America’s attitudes about crime and punishment shifted dramatically.  
Americans, without regard to race, class, or religion, were all shocked by the tragic circumstances of the 
terrorist attack, and have not been reluctant to seek vengeance.  The response in the African American 
community has been particularly surprising, given the history of racial discrimination in America.  As I 
discuss the intersection of race and criminal justice, specifically in the context of capital punishment, it 
is critical to reveal some facts that are frequently ignored in this country today.  African Americans are, 
by and large, conservative.  They are among our nation’s most patriotic citizens.  They are prepared to 
sacrifice their own liberty by supporting governmental efforts to protect their security.  Even though 
discriminatory treatment by law enforcement against African *16 Americans is well documented, [FN2] 
a recent survey indicates that an overwhelming majority of African Americans support the racial 
profiling of Muslims and Arab- Americans as a result of September 11th. [FN3] 
 
  Like the entire criminal justice system, the administration of the death penalty in America places a 
disproportionate burden on African Americans.  The focus of my comments will be on race and capital 
punishment.  Beyond my concerns about race, the death penalty faces challenges from a number of other 
quarters as well.  Among the most recent developments: 
 
● On June 20, 2002, the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, [FN4] holding that it is 
unconstitutional to execute the mentally retarded.  Writing for the court, Justice Stevens followed 
previous decisions articulating how the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment is to be applied.  The Court noted that prohibited forms of punishment are not fixed, 
but rather vary according to “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.” [FN5]  When the Supreme Court upheld executions of the mentally retarded thirteen 
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years ago in Penry v. Lynaugh, [FN6] Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s reasoning for the majority 
was based on a determination that there was no national consensus against the practice--that is, 
executing the mentally retarded did not violate Americans’ notions of decency at the time. [FN7]  
Since that case was decided in 1989, the number of death penalty states barring executions of the 
retarded has grown from two to eighteen, such that eighteen of thirty-eight death penalty states--
and thirty of fifty states total--bar executions of the mentally retarded. [FN8]  In Atkins, Justice 
O’Connor was again in the majority, but this time holding that “evolving standards of decency” 
now prohibit *17 executing the mentally retarded. [FN9] 
 
● Further evidence of the shift in attitude came in late February 2002, when the Georgia Parole 
Board commuted the death sentence of a mentally ill defendant to life in prison. [FN10]  We will 
watch carefully Supreme Court cases in the near future since we can see that even staunch 
supporters of capital punishment, like Justice O’Connor, are noticing the public mood shifting 
away from the death penalty. 
 
● In addition, the Supreme Court issued a stay of execution on February 15, 2002, to Thomas 
Miller-El, an African American death row inmate in Texas who claims that prosecutors 
deliberately kept African Americans off the jury during his murder trial. [FN11]  Miller-El’s case 
could provide some much-needed clarity to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on racial 
discrimination in jury selection, and, as I will discuss shortly, could also provide one step toward 
reducing the disparities in sentencing rates of people of color sitting on death row. 
 
● The Supreme Court also recently found unconstitutional state death penalty laws that allow the 
judge, rather than the jury, to decide whether the death penalty will be imposed.  This case, Ring 
v. Arizona, [FN12] implicates capital punishment laws in nine states, calling into question up to 
800 death sentences. [FN13] 
 
● More recently, a federal district court judge in New York struck down the Federal Death Penalty 
Act as unconstitutional because it “deprived innocent people of a significant opportunity to prove 
their innocence ... [and] creates an undue risk of executing innocent people.” [FN14]  On 
September 24, 2002, a federal district judge in Vermont overturned a death sentence based on a 
finding that the Federal Death Penalty Act determines eligibility for imposition of the death 
penalty in a manner inconsistent with Sixth Amendment *18 and Due Process rights. [FN15]  
The court also noted that “[c]apital punishment is under siege.” [FN16] 
 
● And finally, Professor James Liebman of Columbia Law School released the second part of his 
comprehensive study of error rates in capital sentencing in early 2002.  The initial findings from 
two years ago showed an error rate in capital sentencing of 68%--that is, more than two out of 
every three death sentences were overturned due to “serious error.” [FN17]  Further study has 
shown that the states that use the death penalty most often have error rates that exceed the 
national average, and that the occurrence of capital sentencing error is higher in states that have a 
higher proportion of African Americans in the population. [FN18] 
 
  In addition to issues regarding who should be eligible for execution, who makes that decision, and how 
to guarantee accuracy and avoid error, there is a fundamental issue regarding the role that race has 
played in the death penalty in America.  I will discuss a number of racial elements of the application of 
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capital punishment, and I will specifically mention the impact of the death penalty on black defendants, 
black victims, and black communities.  In the context of race, I will note the connection between the 
current system of capital punishment and the historical use of extra-judicial lynchings against blacks 
during the Jim Crow era.  Based on this analysis I will then raise some questions regarding the best 
strategies for abolitionists who want to address the racially disparate impact of the death penalty. 
 
  I. The Legacy of Lynching 
 
  In a sense, to take a historical view, the racially disproportionate application of the death penalty can be 
seen as being in historical continuity with the long and sordid history of lynching in this country.  It is 
also notable in this regard that the states of *19 what is often called the “Death Belt” [FN19]--the 
southern states that together account for over 90% of all executions carried out since 1976--overlap 
considerably with the southern states that had the highest incidence of extra-legal violence and killings 
during the Jim Crow era. [FN20]  This similarity appears to be more than mere coincidence or 
correlation--and indeed, a cursory evaluation of some of the factors that explain the high incidence of 
lynching shows that many of those factors are present in the impulse to impose capital punishment 
today. 
 
  Before evaluating the factors that motivated lynchings in America, it is instructive to begin with a case 
study. [FN21]  While the facts of the case described in the Supreme Court’s decision of United States v. 
Shipp [FN22] seem astonishing in many respects, they were altogether common in many places in this 
country at the time. 
 
  In a cemetery in Chattanooga, Tennessee, lies an unremarkable headstone for Ed Johnson, a black man 
born in 1882 who died at the hands of a white lynch mob on March 19, 1906. [FN23]  The inscription 
reads: “God bless you all.  I am an innocent man . . . Farewell until we meet again in the sweet by and 
by.” [FN24] 
 
  Ed Johnson was a young, uneducated African American who grew up in Chattanooga.  He had no job, 
no home, and no immediate family.  In the early 1900s, he was wrongly accused of raping a white 
woman.  During his trial, he was taunted by the public, the press, and even by a member of the jury.  
The trial judge and the Tennessee trial courts ignored both these procedural injustices and his actual 
innocence.  An all-white jury convicted *20 him of rape, and there was vocal demand for him to be 
lynched.  The lives of two black lawyers and a white Supreme Court justice intersected in an effort to 
save Ed Johnson from an unfair conviction and an illegal lynching. 
 
  Noah Parden and his law partner, Styles Hutchins, feared that the local sheriff, Joseph Shipp, would 
allow an unruly, white lynch mob to kill Ed Johnson before Johnson’s conviction and sentence could be 
reviewed.  Parden and Hutchins took the unprecedented step of traveling to Washington, D.C., to ask the 
Supreme Court to hear Mr. Johnson’s appeal. [FN25] 
 
  In what may be the first argument ever made by African American lawyers before a Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court, Parden and Hutchins met with Justice John Marshall Harlan and urged 
him to intervene to prevent Johnson’s lynching in Tennessee.  Many recall Justice Harlan’s powerful 
and lonely dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, [FN26] in which he argued:  
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[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, 
dominant, ruling class of citizens.  There is no caste here.  Our Constitution is color-
blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.  In respect of civil rights, 
all citizens are equal before the law.  The humblest is the peer of the most powerful.  The 
law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when 
his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved. [FN27] 
 
  Parden and Hutchins were fortunate that Justice Harlan accepted their arguments that the Supreme 
Court should intervene to ensure an opportunity for appellate review of a fatally defective conviction.  
Justice Harlan issued a stay of execution, prohibiting the state of Tennessee from executing Johnson. 
Despite this impressive victory, Sheriff Shipp and the white lynch mob ignored the Supreme Court’s 
directive.  As the Supreme Court subsequently determined, Sheriff Shipp facilitated the mob’s efforts to 
remove Mr. Johnson from jail and to lynch him. [FN28]  In fact, Mr. Johnson was lynched, shot and his 
body mutilated.  In an unprecedented step, the U.S. Department of Justice filed contempt of court 
charges in the Supreme Court against Sheriff *21 Shipp and several associates. [FN29]  They were 
convicted, but in further irony to Ed Johnson’s death, received sentences of less than three months. 
 
  Unfortunately, the tragic circumstances did not end with Ed Johnson’s lynching.  The two African 
American lawyers, Parden and Hutchins, became frequent targets of death threats, were ostracized by 
African Americans in their own community for stirring up racial tensions, and virtually lost their law 
practice. [FN30] 
 
  Even Parden’s minister publicly opposed the effort to appeal Johnson’s conviction to the Supreme 
Court, telling the Chattanooga News that “[t]he best [element] of the colored people do not approve of 
reopening the case and the colored lawyers who are advocating it are making a serious mistake, not only 
for themselves but for the community in which they live.” [FN31] 
 
  The Johnson case is but one example of many lynchings that took place in the South--the Tuskegee 
Institute estimates that nearly 5,000 lynchings took place between 1882 and 1968. [FN32]  While 
lynchings no longer occur at the same frequency as during the Jim Crow era, the practice certainly did 
not stop in the 1960s--to give one prominent example, just four years ago in Texas, an African American 
was chained by two white assailants to the back of a pickup truck, and was dragged through the streets 
until he was decapitated. [FN33] 
 
  A number of factors appear to have motivated the practice of lynching.  At a fundamental level, 
lynching was an expression of racism and racial discrimination--it reflected an effort to assert the 
superiority of whites over blacks.  A number of sociologists, including Gunnar Myrdal, have suggested 
that lynching was a tool used to maintain racial caste distinctions and to keep blacks in a position of 
subjugation. [FN34]  As such, it served not only to eliminate individual blacks who had violated social 
norms, but also functioned as a powerful incentive for blacks to “learn their place.”  Even a summary 
glance at the statistics presented in *22 more recent examinations of racial disparities in capital 
sentencing, to be discussed shortly, demonstrates that racial discrimination is still a powerful force in the 
decisions the legal system makes about who gets to live and who will die. 
 
  In addition, a number of historians have commented on the recreational element of extralegal killings.  
As one historian wrote: “In rural [areas] . . . lynchings, manhunts and kidnappings certainly offered a 
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degree of ‘excitement’ to otherwise culturally deprived southerners.  The noted social critic H.L. 
Mencken said as much when he argued that the gala events surrounding lynchings were pathological 
substitutes for more normal community activities.” [FN35]  That an element of recreation still exists in 
legal executions today is reflected in contemporary accounts of execution observers. The Reverend Jesse 
Jackson quoted a prison pastor as stating, on the eve of an execution by hanging in 1993: “If this 
execution . . . were not in its essence an act of barbarism, there would not have been more than 100 
reporters waiting to see if they would be chosen by lottery to serve as one of the 12 official witnesses of 
the actual execution.” [FN36]  And more than 1,500 journalists applied to witness Timothy McVeigh’s 
execution; [FN37] this in addition to the thousands of requests that Attorney General John Ashcroft 
received for the execution to be publicly televised. [FN38] 
 
  Lynchings served a number of other purposes as well.  The impulse may have been an expression of 
anti-state sentiments, or more specifically, a concern that state judicial processes were not to be trusted 
to reach the correct outcome.  In this regard, lynchings may have reflected concern with the possibility 
of acquittals, or a concern for the delay between the moment of judgment and the moment when the 
sentence would be carried out. 
 
  In addition, lynching can be seen as a manifestation of a peculiar culture of violence in America’s 
southern states. [FN39]  A number of historians have discussed the southern “code of honor,” which *23 
justified extreme violence when that code was breached, and thus promoted and countenanced lynching 
and mob violence. [FN40] 
 
  Given the many similarities between the illegal but often officially sanctioned practice of lynching, and 
the current imposition of the death penalty, it seems at times that the only difference between lynching 
and capital punishment is the gloss of legality and procedural regularity that the latter enjoys.  In this 
regard, application of the death penalty may be fairer than the vigilante justice that characterized the Jim 
Crow era, but not by much. 
 
  In fact, a number of scholars and activists have referred to America’s history of lynching and Jim Crow 
as the appropriate point of reference for an understanding of the dynamics of our current legal system.  
Reverend Jackson used the title “Legal Lynching” for his book on the death penalty; [FN41] and 
Professor Emma Coleman Jordan has hypothesized that “lynching [is] a contemporary civic metaphor 
for the black experience within the American legal system.” [FN42] 
 
  II Race and the Death Penalty 
 
  This history of lynching and the reasons for its prevalence will be useful to bear in mind as we consider 
the ways in which race still predominates in the American criminal justice system. 
 
 
A. Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection 
 
  An examination of recent findings just in the area of racial jury composition illustrates this point.  Race 
has historically played a role in the ability of black defendants to invoke their right under the U.S. 
Constitution to a fair and impartial jury of their peers, [FN43] *24 and the racial composition of the jury 
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is of particular importance in capital cases.  These rights are dramatically undermined by the use of 
peremptory jury challenges as a pretext for discriminating against people of color. 
 
  Some background into the relevant history and caselaw is necessary at this point.  In the 1986 decision 
Batson v. Kentucky,[FN44] the Supreme Court held that prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges to 
exclude potential jurors on the basis of race violated the Equal Protection Clause.  In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshall (who had other problems with the decision, to be discussed in a 
moment) celebrated the decision as a “historic step toward eliminating the shameful practice of racial 
discrimination in the selection of juries.” [FN45] 
 
  Before Batson, prosecutors routinely struck black jurors based purely on racism, or gross racial 
prejudice and generalizations.  The history of criminal prosecution in Dallas County, Texas, is 
illustrative of this point.  The prosecutor’s office in Dallas County prepared a jury selection instruction 
book that included the following instruction: “Do not take Jews, Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans or a member 
of any minority race on a jury no matter how rich or well educated.” [FN46]  Even once the instruction 
manual was revised to remove the explicitly racist terms, prosecutors were still advised to eliminate 
“any member of a minority group” from a petit jury. [FN47] 
 
  While such blatant and outrageous instructions now seem to be a relic of the past, existing statistical 
evidence reveals the continuing disproportionate use of peremptory challenges to remove blacks from 
the venire. [FN48]  As one commentator has explained, *25 “the discriminatory use of peremptory 
challenges is the single most significant means by which racial prejudice and bias are injected into the 
jury selection system.” [FN49] 
 
  Batson has been viewed as a major accomplishment in the effort to eliminate this form of jury 
discrimination.  The Court in Batson reaffirmed the principle, established in Strauder v. West Virginia, 
[FN50] that a state denies a black defendant equal protection by putting him on trial before a jury from 
which members of his race have been purposefully excluded. [FN51] Moreover, Batson reaffirmed the 
principle, announced in Swain v. Alabama, [FN52] that a state’s purposeful denial of jury participation 
on the basis of race also violates the excluded juror’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. 
[FN53] 
 
  The Batson decision, however, left to the trial courts the important issue of determining whether a 
defendant had established a prima facie case of discrimination, and whether the prosecution had rebutted 
that prima facie showing.  The Supreme Court has since provided lower courts with little direction 
regarding how those determinations are to be made, and has declined to give lower courts more 
information on how to determine when a prosecutor’s race-neutral justifications for challenges are 
acceptable. 
 
  State and lower federal courts have shown widely different views regarding the existence of a prima 
facie case under Batson.  At the trial level, many courts frequently accept explanations that are no more 
than after-the-fact rationalizations for challenges which appear to have been made on subconsciously 
racial grounds. [FN54]  For example, although the Alabama Supreme Court *26 has insisted that “[n]o 
merely whimsical or fanciful reason will suffice as an adequate explanation,” [FN55] state trial courts 
have not always scrutinized prosecutorial explanations closely.  In Wallace v. Alabama, [FN56] the 
prosecutor explained that he challenged: 
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  • A young black female because she was a homemaker and lacked knowledge of what life was like out 
on the street; 
 
  • Another young black female because she was a student who did not indicate that she was working, 
and therefore “would not have had the necessary experience to be able to draw on and make a judgment 
in this case”; 
 
  • An older black female who was retired, and might be more sympathetic because she “appeared to be a 
grandmotherly type”; 
 
  • A young black male who had a beard, which the prosecutor explained meant he was likely to “go 
against the grain”; 
 
  • A middle-aged black man because he was unemployed and therefore might be irresponsible; and 
 
  • A middle-aged black female because she appeared to be in the same age group as the defendants’ 
parents or mothers. [FN57] 
 
  Amazingly, the trial court found the prosecutor’s thin, allegedly “race- neutral” explanations sufficient 
to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination, and the appeals court affirmed. [FN58] 
 
  In Missouri v. Alexander, [FN59] a prosecutor explained that he challenged a black juror because the 
juror was unemployed, did not understand one of the questions asked during voir dire, and lived in a 
high crime neighborhood. [FN60]  Unemployment, lower education, *27 and crime are found more 
frequently in minority communities, yet the court seemed unconcerned that minorities might be 
excluded disproportionately because of these reasons. 
 
 
B. Disproportionate Imposition of Capital Punishment 
 
  Death penalty opponents have been pursuing claims of racial discrimination in the application of the 
death penalty for a long time.  A number of major death penalty cases were actually brought as racial 
discrimination claims, even though the Supreme Court chose to decide the cases on other grounds.  One 
example is Coker v. Georgia, [FN61] in which the Supreme Court invalidated laws that imposed the 
death penalty for the crime of rape. 
 
  Coker had argued in his brief to the Supreme Court that capital sentencing was tainted by an 
impermissible degree of racial bias.  Coker presented evidence that over a twenty-year period in the 
South, black men accused of raping white women were more than eighteen times as likely to be 
sentenced to death as white men accused of the same crime. [FN62]  But the Supreme Court decided the 
case solely on the grounds that the death penalty was disproportionate to the crime of rape, and was thus 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. [FN63]  The 
Court completely sidestepped the racial issue--remarkably, there is not a single mention of race, or of 
Coker’s racial argument, in the Court’s reported opinion. 
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  There is ample other data of racial disparities in the criminal justice system.  In February 2002, Human 
Rights Watch released an analysis of the 2000 Census data, and reported a number of disturbing, if 
unsurprising, findings: [FN64] 
 
  • Blacks and Hispanics make up 62% of the incarcerated population, though comprising only 25% of 
the national population. [FN65] 
 
  *28 • In twelve states, between 10-15% of the black male population is in prison. 
 
  • In some states, Hispanic youths are incarcerated at seven to seventeen times the rate of white youths, 
and black youths are incarcerated at twelve to twenty-five times the rate of whites. 
 
  • Black women are incarcerated at rates between ten and thirty-five times greater than white women in 
fifteen states. 
 
  These statistics serve to highlight what we already knew about the overwhelming degree to which 
blacks are involved in the nation’s penal system-- as Marc Mauer’s famous book Race to Incarcerate 
pointed out, twenty-nine percent of black males born in 1991 can be expected to be imprisoned in their 
lifetime. [FN66] 
 
  The Supreme Court’s silence on the racial disparities in Coker is instructive--the Court was doing its 
best to avoid discussing the overwhelming evidence of racial disparity, and it succeeded.  But less than 
ten years after Coker, the Court confronted the issue of racial discrimination in capital sentencing head-
on, in the landmark case of McCleskey v. Kemp. [FN67] 
 
  Professor David Baldus’ seminal study on racial disparities in the imposition of the death penalty 
[FN68] served as the centerpiece of the McCleskey case, in which Warren McCleskey’s lawyers argued 
that the racially discriminatory application of Georgia’s death penalty statute violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The study revealed racial disparities in the imposition 
of the death penalty in the state of Georgia, and identified the race of both the defendant and the victim 
as determinative factors in whether a defendant would be sentenced to death. [FN69]  Specifically, the 
study noted:  
[D]efendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive a 
death sentence as defendants charged with killing blacks.  According to this model, black 
defendants were 1.1 times as likely to receive a death sentence as other defendants.  Thus, 
the Baldus study indicates that black defendants . . . *29 who kill white victims have the 
greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty. [FN70] 
 
  Professor Baldus also noted a remarkable disparity in the rate at which the death penalty was sought--
”prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of the cases involving black defendants and white victims; 
32% of the cases involving white defendants and white victims; 15% of the cases involving black 
defendants and black victims; and 19% of the cases involving white defendants and black victims.” 
[FN71] 
 
  Writing for the 5-to-4 majority in McCleskey, Justice Lewis Powell conceded that the Baldus study 
was “valid statistically,” [FN72] but concluded that it only demonstrated a risk that race factored into 
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some capital sentencing determinations. [FN73]  The Court determined that the risk of racial 
discrimination in capital sentencing determinations was negligible:  
The likelihood of racial prejudice allegedly shown by the study does not constitute the 
constitutional measure of an unacceptable risk of racial prejudice.  The inherent lack of 
predictability of jury decisions does not justify their condemnation . . . . At most, the 
Baldus study indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race, but this 
discrepancy does not constitute a major systemic defect.  Any mode for determining guilt 
or punishment has its weaknesses and the potential for misuse.  Despite such 
imperfections, constitutional guarantees are met when the mode for determining guilt or 
punishment has been surrounded with safeguards to make it as fair as possible. [FN74] 
 
  While premising its holding on the determination that racial disparity in the administration of the death 
penalty did not constitute a “constitutionally significant risk of racial bias,” [FN75] Justice Powell 
articulated another reason for his holding, which seemed to indicate a fear that treating McCleskey’s 
claim as legitimate would open up a Pandora’s Box and reveal the pervasive role of race in criminal 
processes:  
McCleskey’s claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious question the 
principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system. The Eighth Amendment is not 
limited in application to capital punishment, but applies to all penalties.  *30 Thus, if we 
accepted McCleskey’s claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital 
sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of 
penalty. . . . [T]here is no limiting principle to the type of challenge brought by 
McCleskey.  The Constitution does not require that a State eliminate any demonstrable 
disparity that correlates with a potentially irrelevant factor in order to operate a criminal 
justice system that includes capital punishment. [FN76] 
 
  Thus, despite overwhelming evidence of discrimination, [FN77] the response of the courts has been to 
deny relief on the grounds that patterns of racial disparities are insufficient to prove racial bias in 
individual cases. Justice William Brennan criticized this approach, remarking:  
It is tempting to pretend that minorities on death row share a fate in no way connected to 
our own, that our treatment of them sounds no echoes beyond the chambers in which they 
die.  Such an illusion is ultimately corrosive, for the reverberations of injustice are not so 
easily confined. [FN78] 
 
  While the Court offered a number of rationalizations to deny Warren McCleskey relief, Justice 
Brennan’s strongly-worded dissent left no doubt as to the significance of race in the application of the 
death penalty.  As Justice Brennan explained:  
At some point in this case, Warren McCleskey doubtless asked his lawyer whether a jury 
was likely to sentence him to die.  A candid reply to this question would have been 
disturbing.  First, counsel would have to tell McCleskey that few of the details of the 
crime or of McCleskey’s past criminal conduct were more important than the fact that his 
victim was white.  Furthermore, counsel would feel bound to tell McCleskey that 
defendants charged with killing white victims in Georgia are 4.3 times as likely to be 
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sentenced to death as defendants charged with killing blacks. In addition, frankness 
would compel the disclosure that it was more likely than not that the race of McCleskey’s 
victim would determine whether he received a death sentence: 6 of every 11 defendants 
convicted of killing a white person would not have received the death penalty if their 
victims had been black. . . . Finally, the assessment would not be complete without the 
information that cases involving black defendants and white victims are more likely to 
result in a death sentence than cases featuring any other racial combination of defendant 
and victim.  The story could be told in a variety of ways, but McCleskey could not fail to 
grasp its essential *31 narrative line: there was a significant chance that race would play a 
prominent role in determining if he lived or died. [FN79] 
 
  Regrettably, Justice Powell did respond to Justice Brennan’s challenge, but only after he left the Court.  
When interviewed by his biographer and asked whether there were any decisions he would change, he 
stated that he would have voted differently on McCleskey. [FN80] 
 
  What Justice Brennan characterized as the “reverberations of injustice” are still being felt today.  A 
number of recent studies show that racially disproportionate death penalty sentencing is as pervasive as 
ever, and continues to plague the capital punishment system. 
 
 
C. Recent Empirical Findings 
 
  Two recent studies by Professor Baldus report a number of key findings.  First, as I discussed earlier, 
Batson has not been particularly successful in eliminating racially-motivated peremptory challenges in 
capital trials. [FN81]  Second, and perhaps more importantly, there is a distinct correlation between the 
likelihood that a jury will return a capital sentence and the number of blacks on the jury--the more black 
jurors there are, the less likely the jury is to return a death sentence. [FN82]  This correlation grows even 
stronger when the capital defendant is black. 
 
  A recent study from Professor William Bowers, resulting from his work with the Capital Jury Project, 
confirms the finding that the more black members there are on a jury, the less likely the jury is to return 
a death sentence. [FN83]  Again, the pattern is even more noticeable when the defendant is black.  
Professor Bowers interviewed capital jurors to identify what might explain this *32 striking result, and 
his findings confirm the assertion that capital sentencing is unacceptably susceptible to racial factors.  
Jurors listed three main considerations that weighed into a decision whether to apply the death penalty: 
lingering doubts about the defendant’s guilt, [FN84] the extent of the defendant’s remorsefulness, and 
the defendant’s future dangerousness. [FN85]  In each consideration, black jurors viewed black 
defendants more favorably than did white jurors. [FN86]  When evaluations of the defendant’s character 
are so starkly different along racial lines, and when the result of the evaluation means the difference 
between lethal injection or life in prison, we can see that battles over who sits on the jury really are 
battles for life or death. 
 
 
D. Burdens Resulting from Racially Disproportionate Capital Sentencing 
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  In light of the continued racial imbalance in the application of the death penalty, the burden that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in McCleskey places on blacks continues to operate at a number of levels.  At 
the first, most obvious level, the racially disproportionate sentencing of blacks puts black defendants in 
the position of having their actions judged and punished more harshly than similarly situated white 
defendants. 
 
  At a second level, however, the racial imbalance in how death sentences are handed out shows a 
disregard for black victims.  Disproportionate application of the death penalty in cases where the victim 
is white compared to cases where the victim is black reflect a disturbing racial calculus: White lives are 
considered to be more valuable than black lives, because the killing of a white is treated as a more 
serious crime--a crime worthy of a more severe punishment--than the killing of a black. 
 
  And at a third level, following from this devaluation of black life, we can see that the judicial failure to 
acknowledge racially disproportionate capital sentencing shows a systemic disregard for black 
communities.  By treating the lives of black victims as being less valuable than the lives of white 
victims, the Court’s *33 death penalty jurisprudence deprives black communities of equal access to and 
treatment by the justice system.  Professor Randall Kennedy has pointed out a seeming paradox in 
claims of this kind--he notes that because most killers of blacks are other blacks, correcting the systemic 
bias that assigns more lenient punishment to killers of blacks would ultimately result in more blacks 
being sent to death row. [FN87]  Kennedy argues that “the [black] community as a whole is 
disadvantaged by the relative leniency extended to killers of blacks, but black . . . criminals who murder 
Negroes benefit from the undervaluation of black victims.  Remedying that bias . . . might move some 
black criminals closer to the gas chamber.” [FN88] 
 
  The fallacy of this assertion, with all due respect to my colleague, Professor Kennedy, is that he 
assumes the way to rectify this imbalance is to move in the direction of executing more people--that is, 
he claims that the way to address the undervaluation of black life is to sentence black killers of other 
blacks to death at the same (higher) rate at which black killers of whites are sentenced to death.  
However, we could approach the problem instead by ceasing to over-value white life so much--that is, 
we could decrease the rate at which we execute black killers of whites such that it matches the rate at 
which we execute black killers of blacks.  Rather than executing more people, we could execute fewer. 
 
  More importantly, the undervaluation of black life is not just evident in our capital sentencing rates, but 
is seen in the grossly racially disproportionate way in which our entire system of criminal justice 
operates.  These racial differences occur at every stage of criminal processing, from arrest, prosecution, 
and jury selection to trial conduct, sentencing, and parole. 
 
  Justice Powell’s majority opinion in McCleskey recognized this reality, when he noted, as I quoted 
earlier, that “McCleskey’s claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious question the 
principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system.” [FN89]  Justice Powell recognized that if 
statistical evidence of racially disparate impact sufficed to call the procedural regularity of the death 
penalty into question, every stage of the criminal justice *34 system would be vulnerable to the same 
charge. Unfathomably, rather than taking that as a reason to reject the death penalty imposed in 
McCleskey’s case, Justice Powell claimed that the Court should punt on the issue, leaving it instead to 
the legislature to deal with if it so chose.  As Justice Brennan suggested in his dissenting opinion, this 
astounding rationale “[t]aken on its face . . . seems to suggest a fear of too much justice.” [FN90]  This 
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is exactly the claim I am making with respect to the disregard for black defendants, black victims, and 
black communities that we see in the way the death penalty is administered--capital punishment is but 




Conclusion: Strategic Questions for Death Penalty Opponents 
  This discussion of the current state of the system of capital punishment in America leads to an obvious 
question: Now what?  What strategies can we pursue to move toward the possible objectives identified 
in the title of this conference--Abolition, Moratorium, or Reform?  And as an abolitionist, I must ask as 
well: How do we choose which of these objectives to pursue most vigorously? 
 
  Professors Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker have argued that the history of constitutional regulation of 
the death penalty since the Gregg v. Georgia [FN91] decision in 1976 has focused almost entirely on 
making incremental refinements to procedural aspects of the capital sentencing process. [FN92] If we 
think of opposition to the death penalty as having been effective mostly along the lines of incremental 
procedural fixes, it does not take much of a stretch to see that the current system of capital punishment is 
really in continuity with the American history of extra-legal violence and lynching--it is just more 
procedurally protected and has the minor additional virtue of being legal. 
 
  This point raises important issues of strategy for those who oppose the death penalty.  As an 
abolitionist, I feel that we must constantly be asking what the likely outcome will be from any *35 
arguments we raise against the death penalty.  Most arguments of unconstitutionality could be addressed 
in ways that actually strengthen, or further entrench, the system of capital punishment in this country.  
As one commentator recently noted: “[B]y focusing on flaws in the operation of the death penalty, 
opponents run the risk of surrendering the moral argument.  They might also find themselves 
inadvertently helping to repair a system they would rather see eliminated,” ending up with a 
“modernized, sanitized death penalty.” [FN93] 
 
  For example, the issue of innocence and DNA testing has been much in the news lately.  Two years 
ago, Illinois Governor George Ryan imposed an indefinite moratorium on executions in his state, 
following the exoneration of thirteen prisoners who had been incorrectly sent to death row. [FN94]  And 
the recent book by Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld, and Jim Dwyer --Actual Innocence-- conducted an 
extensive analysis of the risks of executing innocent defendants and suggested that there is some 
evidence that we have already executed defendants who were wrongly convicted. [FN95]  The risk of 
executing the innocent can be a powerful argument for the abolition of the death penalty, but it can also 
be used by retentionists to strengthen their position as well.  Say that the resources are made available to 
deploy DNA testing in every capital case, and the identity of the defendant is positively identified each 
time-- concern about innocence would no longer be a valid objection to the death penalty.  As one 
author argued recently:  
DNA evidence will in fact lead to greater support for the death penalty in the long run. . . 
. While many people in this country currently may be concerned by the potential for 
mistakes in determining the guilt of a defendant, once they are convinced that there is 
little likelihood of mistake, the majority will continue to support the death penalty. 
[FN96] 
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  *36 As another example, a number of recent legal challenges to the system of capital punishment in 
America have focused on the “death row phenomenon”-- the claim that extensive incarceration under 
the conditions on death row causes such psychological trauma as to constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. [FN97]  A number of abolitionists have argued that 
the procedural requirements of the administration of the death penalty in America result in so many 
levels of direct and collateral review that all condemned prisoners face the possibility of an 
indeterminate and inordinately long stay on death row.  Indeed, a number of foreign and international 
tribunals have accepted this claim. [FN98]  Again, however, there is a retentionist argument lurking 
here--if there is a problem with excessive delay in the execution of a death sentence, we should just pass 
more laws like the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), [FN99] to restrict 
the opportunities for collateral review of a death sentence. 
 
  It is even possible that a moratorium, such as that in place in Illinois, and as proposed nationwide by 
the American Bar Association, [FN100] could serve as a means for marshaling support for the continued 
use of capital punishment rather than its abolition.  A recent survey of public opinion on death penalty 
matters reveals that about the same percentage of Americans favor a moratorium as favor the death 
penalty, and notes that these results are not necessarily inconsistent. [FN101] 
 
  All of these examples raise the question whether any of the *37 successes that the abolition movement 
has achieved, especially since the death penalty was reinstated after Gregg, have brought us any closer 
to getting rid of capital punishment for good; or whether at each juncture we have only pointed out the 
most glaring errors so that retentionists could fix them and then say-- see, it’s okay for us to have the 
death penalty, we’ve fixed the irregularities in the system.  This is not an unimportant concern; after all, 
most of the procedural protections now provided for in the administration of capital punishment came 
out of constitutional challenges to the death penalty. 
 
  One way that the strategy of incremental, procedural change might succeed is to force what might be 
called the “Blackmun Revelation.”  As Justice Harry Blackmun wrote eight years ago in his dissenting 
opinion in Callins v. Collins, [FN102] just months before stepping down from the Supreme Court:  
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death.  For more 
than 20 years I have endeavored--indeed, I have struggled-- along with a majority of this 
Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend more than the mere 
appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor.  Rather than continue to coddle the 
Court’s delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved and the need for 
regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede that 
the death penalty experiment has failed. [FN103] 
 
  The Blackmun Revelation is thus that none of these incremental changes ever ultimately remedy the 
problem, so at some point we must conclude that perhaps the problem cannot be remedied. 
 
  This is the same revelation that Justice Powell reached, as I mentioned earlier, although regrettably he 
was off the Court by this time.  As Justice Powell’s biographer has claimed, his statement that he would 
change his vote in McCleskey was based not on fundamental moral opposition to the death penalty, but 
rather on a concern that it could never be fairly and non-arbitrarily administered. 
 
  As Justice Blackmun further stated in Callins:  
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Twenty years have passed since this Court declared that the death penalty must be 
imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all, see Furman v. Georgia, 
and, despite the effort of the States and courts to devise legal formulas and *38 
procedural rules to meet this daunting challenge, the death penalty remains fraught with 
arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice, and mistake.  This is not to say that the problems 
with the death penalty today are identical to those that were present 20 years ago.  Rather, 
the problems that were pursued down one hole with procedural rules and verbal formulas 
have come to the surface somewhere else, just as virulent and pernicious as they were in 
their original form. [FN104] 
 
  Are we just chasing these problems down one hole, only to have them reappear, just as virulent and 
pernicious, from another?  How can we shape our advocacy and activism to put the death penalty away 
for good? 
 
  The struggle for racial equality is inextricably tied to the struggle for fairness in the criminal justice 
system.  And in both of these struggles, there is a long road ahead.  Six months before he died, Justice 
Marshall spoke from Independence Hall in Philadelphia, where he received the Liberty Bell Award on 
July 4, 1992.  He described the unfinished journey to racial equality as follows:  
I wish I could say that racism and prejudice were only distant memories . . . and that 
liberty and equality were just around the bend.  I wish I could say that America has come 
to appreciate diversity and to see and accept similarity. 
 
  But as I look around, I see not a nation of unity but of division--Afro and white, indigenous and 
immigrant, rich and poor, educated and illiterate. 
 
  But there is a price to be paid for division and isolation. . . . 
 
  We cannot play ostrich.  Democracy cannot flourish amid fear.  Liberty cannot bloom amid hate.  
Justice cannot take root amid rage. . . . We must go against the prevailing wind.  We must dissent from 
the indifference.  We must dissent from the apathy.  We must dissent from the fear, the hatred and the 
mistrust. We must dissent from a government that has left its young without jobs, education, or hope.  
We must dissent from the poverty of vision and the absence of moral leadership.  We must dissent 
because America can do better, because America has no choice but to do better. . . . 
 
  Take a chance, won’t you?  Knock down the fences that divide.  Tear apart the walls that imprison.  
Reach out; freedom lies just on the other side. [FN105] 
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